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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Craig Robert Falk, a Georgia resident with no criminal history, pled guilty pursuant to
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
enhancement and burglary, despite having no recollection of his criminal conduct. The district
court sentenced Mr. Falk to a unified term of twenty years, with nine years fixed, for the
aggravated battery, and ten years fixed for the burglary. Mr. Falk appeals from his judgment of
conviction, challenging his sentences as an abuse of discretion. While the facts of this case are
certainly disturbing, Mr. Falk should not be imprisoned in Idaho, at taxpayer expense, when he
was assessed as presenting a low risk to reoffend, and his criminal conduct can be easily traced
back to his brother, whose ex-wife was the target of Mr. Falk’s assault.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Falk, a

resident of Georgia, traveled from Georgia to Idaho to help his

brother, Roger Quinn. (See Tr., pp.19, 25, 46.) Mr. Falk believed Roger was suicidal on account
of his divorce, and believed Roger’s ex-wife, Karen Quinn, was abusing Roger and Karen’s
daughter. (Tr., pp.19, 25.) This was not a delusion on Mr. Falk’s part—rather, he
was relying on information he received from his brother, after being estranged from him for over
30 years. (Tr., p.47; Conf. Exs., p.213.) A sheriff’s detective testified that Mr. Falk said “[h]is
brother had called him, spent hours on the phone with him talking about the abuse that his
daughter was supposedly suffering, how psychotic Karen was, and . . . kind of painting Karen
out to be a horrible person and abusive towards her daughter.” (Tr., p.26.) Based on what his
brother had told him, Mr. Falk believed “[Karen] needed to stop.” (Tr., p.19.)
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Mr. Falk, who had never before been to Boise, flew to Utah, and then drove to Boise,
apparently in an effort to “scare” Karen. (Tr., p.19.) Mr. Falk claims that, without any urging
from his brother, he drove to Karen’s house on the day after Thanksgiving, and waited for her to
return home. (Tr., p.19.) He entered her garage and attacked her with a metal bar—in his
words—a “prop.” (Tr., p.19.) Karen testified that when she saw Mr. Falk in her garage, she did
not recognize him, but “thought he was there to kill me or something based on a contentious
relationship I have with my ex-husband, who has threatened to kill me in the past.” (Tr., p.13,
L.21 – p.14, L.14.) Karen sustained significant injuries. (Tr., p.21, Ls.12-22.) Roger and Karen’s
daughter witnessed the assault. (Tr., p.19, L.15 – p.20, L.2.)
When interviewed afterwards, Roger told the detective about his allegations of abuse, and
said “he felt that Karen was psychotic and was having affairs, and just a whole host of items.”
(Tr., p.28.) The detective was asked whether, in his opinion, Mr. Falk planned the assault against
Karen himself, and the detective answered, “I believe he had the help of his brother.” (Tr., p.29.)
The State charged Mr. Falk by Information with aggravated battery with a deadly weapon
enhancement and burglary. (R., pp.42-43.) Mr. Falk pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), without the benefit of a plea agreement. (Tr., p.16.) At the change of
plea hearing, he told the district court he “was indeed involved in this horrifying event” but could
not remember anything after it started. (Tr., p.18.) He said he had “no premeditated or
malevolent intent at all.” (Tr., p.18.) The district court accepted Mr. Falk’s plea, and ordered that
he undergo a psychiatric evaluation pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2522. (Tr., pp.20-21; R., pp.7374.) Following that evaluation, the district court sentenced Mr. Falk for aggravated battery with a
deadly weapon enhancement to a unified term of twenty years, with nine years fixed. (Tr., p.53.)
For burglary, the district court sentenced Mr. Falk to ten years fixed, to be served concurrently.
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(Tr., p.53.) The judgment of conviction was entered on September 10, 2020, and Mr. Falk filed a
timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.85-91.)
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ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Falk, a
Georgia resident with no criminal history, to a unified term of twenty years, with nine years
fixed, for aggravated battery, and ten years fixed for burglary.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Falk To A Unified Term Of
Twenty Years, With Nine Years Fixed, For Aggravated Battery, And Ten Years Fixed For
Burglary
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that where, as here, a district court imposes a sentence
within statutory limits, the appellant “has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on
the part of the court imposing the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to succeed on appeal under this standard, an
appellant “must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive
considering the objectives of criminal punishment,” which are deterrence, the possibility of
rehabilitation, punishment or retribution for wrongdoing, and the protection of society. State v.
Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 856 (2001) (citation omitted). Mr. Falk can make the necessary showing,
as his aggregate sentence was excessive considering these four objectives in light of the highly
unusual circumstances of this case.
Mr. Falk’s sentence cannot be justified by the first objective of criminal punishment,
which is deterrence of the individual and the public generally. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856.
Mr. Falk entered an Alford plea without the benefit of a plea agreement, as he accepted
responsibility for his actions, but was adamant that he never intended to harm Karen and could
not recall exactly what occurred. (Conf. Exs., p.28.) He told the presentence investigator:
My realization of violence is personally unresolved as the gap in my memory
remains, and I simply don’t know what exactly happened. But what I do know is
that I approached [Karen] with the intent to only scare her—to urge her to stop
abusing my
niece, and to beseech her to stop terrorizing my brother as
he neared suicidal surrender. Also, I do know, and forthrightly state, that physical
violence was never planned nor ever intended at any point. And one final
certainty is that I will never be involved in anything even close to violent behavior
in the future.
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(Conf. Exs., pp.15-16.) Indeed, Mr. Falk’s violent actions were entirely out of character for him,
and appear to stem from some—clearly misplaced—loyalty to his brother and commitment to
help out in a situation he completed misunderstood. (See Conf. Exs., p.16.) He believed his longlost brother was suicidal, and understood from his brother that Karen “physically and mentally
abused” their daughter, and was herself mentally unstable. (Conf. Exs., p.20.) Mr. Falk views
himself as possessing “an acute sense of empathy” and appears to have acted without questioning
his brother in any way, and without considering the consequences of his actions. (Conf. Exs.,
p.21.) Mr. Falk may have been uniquely vulnerable to his brother’s stories, based on his own life
experience, but it is hard to imagine how he, or anyone in a similar situation, could have been
deterred.
Mr. Falk’s sentence cannot be justified by the second objective of criminal punishment,
which is the possibility of rehabilitation. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. It is not clear what
rehabilitation Mr. Falk might need, apart from having no contact with his brother. Mr. Falk had
no prior arrests, and this was his first felony conviction. (Conf. Exs., pp.9, 14.) Mr. Falk has no
alcohol or drug problems, and no history of violence. (Conf. Exs., p.12.) Mr. Falk struggled with
depression following his own divorce, and was hospitalized in Georgia on two prior occasions.
(Conf. Exs., pp.9, 14.) At sentencing, Karen described the crime as “a horrific error in judgment
that has affected so many people.” (Tr., p.37.) Karen’s statement is accurate. Mr. Falk made a
horrific error in judgment in believing his brother without question, and trying in some distorted
fashion to help out. He described himself as being “horrified, appalled, and utterly bewildered by
[his] violent behavior.” (Conf. Exs., p.28.) But it is not clear how incarceration could possible
aid in Mr. Falk’s rehabilitation.
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Mr. Falk’s sentence also cannot be justified by the third objective of criminal
punishment, which is punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856.
Mr. Falk was

when he committed the crimes at issue, and was on disability

following a heart attack he suffered in 2013. (Conf. Exs., p.212.) Unless his sentence is reduced,
he will likely die in prison. While his conduct is deserving of punishment, it should not deprive
him of his freedom forever.
At sentencing, Karen spoke directly to Mr. Falk, saying: “Do you remember the first and
only thing that I said to you that night, Mr. Falk? . . . I asked you if you were there to kill me as
soon as I saw your face, before I even saw the weapon. Why would I say that? Because your
brother threatened to kill me on multiple occasions, Mr. Falk, and he used you to try to do if. If
only you understood that.” (Tr., p.37.) It appears that Mr. Falk developed some understanding of
how he was misled by his brother over the course of these proceedings. He apologized to Karen
at sentencing, stating: “Any words are going to be grossly inadequate, but to [Karen] and
[Karen’s daughter], I am so very, very, very, very sorry.” (Tr., p.50.) He continued:
Just three days ago, I had my attorney read to me Judge McDevitt’s findings of
fact [from Robert and Karen’s divorce proceedings]. I heard things about my
brother that left me stunned, stunned with the sudden revelation that Roger was
not the person I thought he was. Oh, my God. Not that person at all. Not the lost
brother that had finally found true meaning in his life through his love for [his
daughter], but here was someone with a far more perverse agenda. Was I blinded
by calculated emotional onslaught? Had I portrayed Mr. and Mrs. Quinn in their
exact opposite roles? Oh, my God. To Mrs. Quinn and [her daughter], I am so
very, very, very, very sorry.
(Tr., p.50.) This is a highly unusual case, but it appears the primary person responsible for Karen
being attacked was neither charged nor convicted, and Mr. Falk may be considered, in some
ways, a victim of his brother, too.
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Finally, Mr. Falk’s sentence cannot be justified by the fourth objective of criminal
punishment, which is the protection of society. See Varie, 135 Idaho at 856. Mr. Falk was
assessed as having a “very low level of psychopathy.” (Conf. Exs., p.216.) He was determined to
present a low risk of engaging in future general violence, and was determined to present a low
risk to the public. (Conf. Exs., pp.113, 216-17.) While Mr. Falk could arguably present a
continued risk to Karen, that risk would be lessened by the no-contact order that the district court
entered (which is not challenged on appeal), and would surely be lessened even more if Mr. Falk
returns to Georgia.
This is a very unusual case. While the crimes Mr. Falk committed were horrific, and will
have a lasting impact on Karen and Karen and Roger’s young daughter, a lengthy term of
imprisonment is not warranted. The district court abused its discretion at sentencing, and should
have suspended Mr. Falk’s sentence or retained jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Falk respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he requests that the Court remand this case to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2021.

/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 25th day of March, 2021, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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